The Great Game in Eurasia – Part 2
17 August 2009 - Western Europe’s role in the Great Game has been a relatively minor one, despite the fact that they are part of the land mass and have had long historical contact with countries to the east. Needless to say, apart from contiguity, they are also critically dependant on energy resources in Russia, Central Asia and the Middle East.
The problem for Europe is that its current political makeup virtually guarantees lack of resolve and makes it unable to take decisive action. Getting members of the European Union to act on critical issues is akin to trying to herd cats. There is a good deal of squabbling and a diversity of opinion that prevents focussed policymaking and rapid reaction to changing circumstances.
The central problem is that the same political structures that hamper decisive collective decision-making also prevent individual countries from taking strong independent decisions. As a result, Europe is becoming relatively marginalised as a major player in the game.
Eastern European members of the Union are essentially part of Washington’s game plan vis-à-vis Russia. But the fallout from Moscow’s ire regarding the protection of its sphere of influence will likely descend on Western Europe, not America.
Most European countries are showing little zeal in opposing the Taliban in Afghanistan, leaving it to the Americans to bear the brunt of the fighting. But the fight in Afghanistan is not simply about battling Islamic extremists. Far more importantly, it is about power and influence in Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Indian subcontinent.
It is related to the potential control of projected energy pipelines and economic corridors. New silk routes, reminiscent of the ancient Silk Road, are going to be established across Asia to China, and between Europe and Asia. China has built a major port at Gwadar in Pakistani Baluchistan and the Indians are building one in Chabahar in Iran.
The huge natural gas reserves of Iran’s South Pars field will need to be tapped and exported to markets in Asia and Europe. And plans are afoot for extensive road and rail links all the way from Europe to India. Meanwhile, there is an ongoing struggle among all countries involved, great and small, about the location of pipelines going both east and west. This has more to do with politics than the economics of building them.
Russia is particularly keen to have pipelines from Central Asia cross its territory, even as it is looking for alternative routes westward for exporting its natural gas; in preference to the current one crossing the Ukraine. Europe and America want to bypass Russia even though the cost of building the pipelines will be higher.
The importance of China’s Xinjiang province relates to the development of an economic corridor westward, connecting with the rest of Asia. The recent unrest in Xinjiang may have been the result of earlier policy gaffes and the authorities can’t afford ongoing turmoil in such an important region. It was hardly surprising, though, that foreign agitators were held to be responsible for the troubles.
China is furthering its economic and political interests in many places, including Burma, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and, increasingly, in Iran. Interestingly, it is also looking further afield, symbolised by its offer of economic aid to Moldova, squarely in what Russia considers its own sphere of influence.
China’s concerns are related to ensuring the security of energy supplies from Russia, Central Asia and the Middle East, as well as expanding export markets in the whole of Eurasia. The vendor financing model that operated vis-à-vis the United States in the boom years is no longer viable. It has led to an enormous accumulation of debt obligations issued by the US, and with the future vigour of the American economy in doubt, there is uncertainty about the prospective value of the assets.
For now, the Chinese are forced into a dance with the Americans because the two partners rely on each other and any abrupt move would result in both of them falling down. But China also knows that, as a debtor, America holds more cards; and US policymakers will give priority to promoting domestic issues rather than worry about the value of foreigners’ debt holdings.
Chinese authorities are already working to channel investments away from the United States, planning for the day when the dance will end. There is a high likelihood that the rivalry with the US in Eurasia may increase in the future. It is possible that the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation will be expanded to include countries like Iran, and that its military integration will be tightened to rival NATO, which is already present on China’s doorstep in Afghanistan.
At rallies, in the aftermath of the fraudulent elections in Iran, one could hear the slogans “death to Russia” and “death to China” as a riposte to the usual hardliner cries of “death to America”. The population is very unhappy about the alacrity with which the two countries congratulated Ahmadinejad on his phony victory. Deeper than that, there is concern about Russia and China’s growing influence in Iran.
Past American policy on Iran has been a signal failure. The Bush administration’s refusal to negotiate with moderate forces, its mindless slogans of the “axis of evil”, and the imposition of sanctions have all served to undermine America’s strategic interests. These mistaken policies have merely strengthened the hardliners and pushed Iran further into Russian and Chinese orbits.
The regime in Iran now has all the characteristics of a militarised theocracy. They have dumped the last vestiges of democracy and the rule of law. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and associated security organisations hold real power and exercise it with brutality, having no regard for the constitution.
Originally created by the clerics as a Praetorian guard to defend the regime, the IRGC has grown enormously influential in recent years. Under Ahmadinejad’s presidency their members have been placed in important posts in the bureaucracy, in parliament, in provincial governorships and a variety of organisations. They are also important in the economy, owning a large number of companies that win state tenders without bidding. In addition, they have a controlling interest in missile production and the nuclear programme.
The Islamic regime has lost legitimacy but is hanging on to power, ignoring the popular will. As for the Supreme Leader, like Caesar, he may now be a captive of his Praetorian guard. The regime’s crude propaganda about foreign intervention, the show trials and the lies don’t convince anybody. So holding on to power boils down to using brute force. In the long run this will not work, especially in a country with a tradition of revolution and independent thinking. A cocktail of economic mismanagement, political, social and cultural repression will inevitably explode.
In the short run, the regime can stay in power and is likely to be oriented towards Russia and China rather than the West. This poses a conundrum for the US which has to figure out how to deal with a challenging situation, as Iran’s nuclear programme continues to make progress.
